This study uses a novel lab-in-the-field experiment with health care workers in rural Burkina Faso to investigate how payment mechanisms can incentivize providers to deliver healthcare services to the poor. Importantly, it provides evidence that the effect of bonuses depends on the extra effort needed to serve the poor, and second, that it depends on the pro-poor preferences of health workers. Furthermore, addressing a gap in the literature on the contract preferences of pro-poor workers, this study shows that pro-poor individuals are sensitive to contract type, preferring flat pay over va
Ce document se penche sur les scores de qualité obtenus par les formations sanitaires du FBR afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure le FBR contribue à améliorer la qualité des soins au Burkina Faso. Élaboré en fonction d’une analyse situationnelle et d’une analyse de l’évolution des scores de qualité, ce document tire des enseignements et formule des recommandations afin d’améliorer la qualité des soins au Burkina Faso.
This paper looks at the quality scores obtained by RBF health facilities to determine the extent to which RBF contributes to improving the quality of care in Burkina Faso. Based on an analysis of the evolution of quality scores, coupled with a situational analysis, this paper draws lessons and formulate recommendations for further quality of care improvement in Burkina Faso.
Ce document examine l’appui à la mise en œuvre et l’accompagnement fournis par les agences de contractualisation et de vérification au Burkina Faso. Il explore notamment la mesure dans laquelle les ACV contribue à créer une culture de gestion et de performance promouvant un engagement et une performance accrus de la part des travailleurs de santé.
This paper examines the implementation support and coaching roles played by contracting and verification agencies (CVA) in Burkina Faso, specifically exploring their contribution to creating a culture of “good” management and performance which improves both health worker engagement and performance.
Performance-based financing (PBF) in the health sector has recently gained momentum in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) as one of the ways forward for achieving Universal Health Coverage. The major principle underlying PBF is that health centers are remunerated based on the quantity and quality of services they provide. PBF has been operating in Burkina Faso since 2011, and as a pilot project since 2014 in 15 health districts randomly assigned into four different models, before an eventual scale-up.
We are sharing on this page a set of video vignettes used during a lab-in-the-field experiment in Burkina Faso. We are including 4 vignettes and their related scripts and questions with answer keys. both in their original French and translated English versions.
Detailed financial analyses of PBF schemes are rare in the literature. The authors examine the cost of implementation for two years in Burkina Faso, presenting the data from several perspectives. In addition to many important analyses contained in this paper, the authors break out the cost of verification separate from any other related activity.
Management committees of health facilities (i.e. CoGes in French) are a key way in which the community surrounding the health facility can be involved in the running of the facility, and therefore a vehicle for the voice of the community. The authors argue that the members of the management committees in Burkina Faso have been excluded from the PBF scheme, not benefitting from training nor from financial incentives like the rest of the staff of the health facility.