Can there be such a thing? Well, yes, and it’s what’s resonating in the Eastern Caribbean islands nations of Dominica and Saint Lucia, countries exploring the feasibility of piloting an RBF approach in their health sector. Both countries after all are facing tight budgets and ever increasing demands on their health systems from non-communicable diseases, an ageing population, and a shortage of health workers. So while securing additional funding to pilot an RBF approach may be unlikely, both countries are keen to apply such an approach to an existing area of their health sector budget. After all, Dominica is already implementing results-based performance budgeting and Saint Lucia is initiating performance based financing in their country-wide budgeting process providing an enabling environment in support of RBF.
The trip from Nairobi to Oldoinyo takes about 2,5 hours on a very dusty road through dry wide Masai area. I am in a minibus together with three other participants of the Performance Based Financing training in Nairobi. We were told it was going to take an hour, but as usual it’s a lot longer. Just as I start worrying if I should have brought more water, because my throat is getting dry, the minibus takes a turn and Oldoinyo Dispensary appears.
We are welcomed by a very friendly group of people consisting of the clinical officer in charge, other staff and community members. Our first impression of the health center is good: it looks very clean, has sharps boxes everywhere, there seem to be enough drugs and buildings were recently renovated with funds from the Dutch government. As part of the training, we were assigned to do a quick assessment of the dispensary and discover where their bottle necks are, so we take out our lists and start asking them the questions we prepared.
We ring in 2013 with an explosion of RBF initiatives that reward service providers and overcome demand side challenges, many of them featured on this rbfhealth site. Yet- most of these schemes continue to confront interrupted supplies of medicines and health commodities. In most systems, even highly motivated service providers can’t solve this supply problem. Incentives appear to be dysfunctional along the entire supply system- from the central medical store to the service delivery point and back up the chain. Does RBF hold (part of) the key?
When I read World Bank Group president Jim Kim’s post last week, Three Global Priorities for Women and Girls, one line in particular attracted my attention: "Women in developing countries die in childbirth every 1.5 minutes."
In Zimbabwe, I have seen first-hand how RBF is helping to change that figure. The RBF project that began in 2011, covering two districts and 28 health facilities now operates in 18 districts and 387 health facilities, many of them in rural areas. The results coming in are encouraging – increased access to health services, more institutional deliveries in rural health centers and hospitals, and more children being immunized against common childhood diseases.
Worldwide, nearly 800 women die every day from preventable causes related to pregnancy and childbirth. Ninety-nine percent of all maternal deaths occur in the developing world, and within these countries, it’s the poor who suffer the greatest morbidity and mortality rates. Providing high-quality medical care before, during, and after childbirth is key to saving lives, and reproductive health vouchers are one way we might accomplish that. Today, the Population Council is leading a major research project to evaluate vouchers for their ability to expand poor women’s access to maternal healthcare.
Public health specialists in developing nations are urgently seeking innovative ways to stretch resources to provide more results. Performance-based financing (PBF) has gained prominence as a possible solution because of its emphasis on paying for results rather than inputs. The basis of PBF is that cash or non-monetary benefits are offered in return for measurable actions or the achievement of a defined target.
You may know about PBF in the health service delivery context. For instance, doctors and nurses may be rewarded, if fewer patients acquire infections during a hospital stay. However, PBF interventions can also be used to improve public health supply chains in developing countries. For instance, staff at a central medical store can be rewarded for using a computerized logistics system correctly and for increasing their productivity. By linking a supply chain worker’s performance with rewards, PBF may be able to reduce bottlenecks along the supply chain, reduce stockouts, and improve commodity availability.
The Institut de Formation et de Recherche Démographiques(IFORD) [Institute for Demographic Training and Research] was hired to conduct the impact evaluation baseline survey on the performance-based financing (PBF) program in Cameroon, carried out by the Ministry of Health in 14 health districts and covering a total population of close to 2.6 million. The survey preparation period (October 2011 to February 2012) was followed by the data collection period (March to June 2012). The data entry process, which took place in parallel with the collection exercise, was conducted between April and August 2012.
We, the members of the IFORD survey firm, had made sufficient progress with the baseline survey data analysis when we were invited to attend the Fourth Annual Impact Evaluation Workshop. This workshop is organized annually by the World Bank with the aim of providing technical support to teams whose results-based financing (RBF) programs and impact evaluations are funded by the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF) and implemented through collaboration between the World Bank and the governments of the countries involved. Although the workshop was largely geared toward RBF teams working in the health field, it is our view that it offered the advantage of accommodating, in a broader sense, survey firms involved in impact evaluation processes.
My initial objectives prior to the workshop. As the representative of a survey firm associated with an African development population sciences training and research institution, participation in this important workshop was initially aimed at achieving several objectives. First, I wanted to share about IFORD’s positive and negative experiences with conducting the baseline survey. I also wanted to learn from others and build IFORD’s capacity to carry out impact evaluations of RBF projects, in particular in the technical and evaluation methodology areas. It was also my wish to assimilate enough information to allow me to better position the institution to do evaluation follow up work. Lastly, I also wanted to use this opportunity or forum to help enhance IFORD’s visibility. After these five days
L’Institut de Formation et de Recherche Démographiques (IFORD) a été retenu, après un appel d’offre international, comme firme devant conduire l’enquête de base de l’évaluation d’impact du programme de Financement Basé sur la Performance (FBP) au Cameroun mis en œuvre par le Ministère de la Santé dans 14 districts de santé, couvrant une population totale de près de 2,6 millions d’habitants. Après la préparation de l’enquête qui a eu lieu d’octobre 2011 à février 2012, la collecte des données s’est poursuivie de mars à juin 2012. La saisie des données qui se déroulait parallèlement à la collecte a eu lieu d’avril à août 2012.
Nous, membres du cabinet d’enquêtes de l’IFORD, étions suffisamment avancés dans la phase d’analyse des données de l’enquête de base lorsque nous avons reçu l’invitation au Quatrième Atelier Annuel sur les Résultats et l’Evaluation d’Impact. Cet atelier est organisé annuellement par la Banque mondiale. Son objectif est de fournir un appui technique aux équipes dont les programmes de Financement Basé sur les Résultats (FBR) et leurs évaluations d’impact sont financés par le Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF), et mis en œuvre au m
oyen d’une collaboration entre la Banque mondiale et les Gouvernements des pays concernés. Cet atelier a eu le mérite, à notre humble avis, bien que prioritairement destiné aux équipes de FBR en matière de santé, d’inviter plus largement les firmes d’enquête impliquées dans le processus d’évaluation d’impact.
Mes objectifs initiaux avant l’atelier. En tant que représentant d’un cabinet d’enquête rattaché à une institution de formation et de recherche en sciences de la population pour le développement en Afrique, l’adhésion à cet important atelier visait initialement plusieurs objectifs. D’une part, je souhaitais partager l’expérience de l’IFORD en matière de conduite de l’enquête de base, aussi bien sur ce qui a marché que ce qui n’a pas fonctionné. Je voulais également apprendre des autres et renforcer les capacités de l’IFORD dans la mise en œuvre des évaluations d’impact des projets de FBR, notamment sur les aspects techniques et méthodologiques de l’évaluation. Il était également question de tirer suffisamment de leçons me permettant de mieux positionner l’institution pour la suite de l’évaluation. Enfin, j’envisageais aussi d’utiliser cette opportunité, cette tribune, pour contribuer à une plus grande visibilité de l’IFORD. A la fin de ces cinq jours de travail, d’échange, d’apprentissage au sein de treize autres équipes soutenues par le HRITF, qu’avais-je tiré de l’atelier, avais-je atteint mes objectifs? Plus important encore, qu’en est-il des conséquences de l’atelier sur la suite de l’évaluation d’impact du FBP au Cameroun ? Quel a été l’impact de l’atelier sur la capacité de l’IFORD à progresser dans la mise en œuvre d’évaluations d’impact : avait-on renforcé nos capacités méthodologiques, avait-on renforcé notre positionnement stratégique en tant que cabinet d’études qualifié pour ces études complexes?
Poor financing, uncoordinated donor interventions, and a dependence on user fees, in a nation where 71.3% live below the national poverty line, pose a major challenge for health financing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Results-based approaches, like Pay-for-Performance (P4P) offer one way to potentially increase access to health services for the poor, by providing an incentive for health workers to improve their performance and the level of service delivery.
Can P4P work under extreme conditions, such as the DRC context?
Mayo-Ine Health Center lies in Fufore district in Adamawa State in North-East Nigeria. One year ago it was a typical health center in rural Nigeria. Years of neglect had left their mark. The fence was damaged, the roof caving in places, windows broken, and equipment gone. Medical waste was scattered in the backyard, some of it half burnt. Goats were searching the waste, nibbling on edible bits of carton. The center had no running water. Its latrines were defunct. Essential drugs were out of stock and vaccines were rarely available. There had not been supervision from the district for a long time and staff were demoralized and on strike.
The population had gotten used to the situation and was rarely using the facility. In December 2011, just four women delivered at Mayo-Ine, and on average it saw 4 patients per day. The few patients that came were prescribed expensive treatments with drugs which the health workers had bought and sold against a hefty mark-up, making any treatment very expensive. People preferred the local drug vendor who would sell drugs cheaply by the tablet – which fitted their budget better - and consulted with traditional healers.